Abu Faraj Al-Libbi's Arrest A Decisive Blow To Al Qeda

By Amir Mir 

The May, 3, 2005 arrest from Pakistan of Abu Faraj Al-Libbi, the chief operational commander of al-Qaeda, is the most significant blow to the Osama-led terror network since the March 2003 capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the former chief operational commander from Rawalpindi, as Libbi is considered one of the few al-Qaeda leaders who could possibly know the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and his deputy Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

Libbi was arrested on May 3, 2005 from Mardan -- the second biggest city in the country's North Western Frontier Province which borders Afghanistan. Washington and Islamabad had announced rewards of five million dollars and Rs. 20 million respectively as head money for information leading up to Libbi's arrest. After an intense hunt, the American intelligence sleuths finally spotted him with the help of his satellite phone which he was using to communicate with other group

members. He has already been shifted to the federal capital where he is being interrogated jointly by high ranking American and Pakistani intelligence officials at an undisclosed location in Islamabad. He has so far spoken about his immediate Pakistani contacts in the al-Qaeda who used to pass on his messages.

Libbi's capture has triggered speculations that he can provide crucial leads and put life back into the stalled American efforts to hunt down Osama bin Laden. As Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's top deputy, Faraj is believed to have played an important role in organizing the 9/11 attacks. Abu Faraj used to operate out of the tribal areas of western Pakistan, like Osama and Zawahiri, who, intelligence officials believe, are hiding in the troubled Waziristan region of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan. A Libyan national, Libbi's name as an important al-Qaeda operative surfaced after it transpired that he had masterminded two abortive assassination attacks on General Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in 2003.

Intelligence sources say that Libbi had been on the run for more than three and a half years in Afghanistan, Waziristan and many other places after the fall of the Taliban regime and his choices of hideouts had become limited. He had reportedly moved to Mardan recently after deserting his Waziristan hideout that had become risky after the Pakistan Army launched a military operation there. The arrest was made after officers from the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), acting on a tip from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), raided a suspected hideout in Mardan. The raid turned into a chase when two of the suspects fled from the scene while riding a motorbike towards the Swabi-Jenagira Road, with one of them later identified as al-Qaeda's No. 3 Abu Faraj Al-Libbi, who was clad in a

shuttlecock Burqa while riding a motorbike along with his companion.

The chase involving three vehicles ended at Sahibzar Khan Koorona, near Shah Dhand Ziarat, when security officials overpowered the man driving the bike. The officials fired at the other suspect, who ran towards an under-construction house and jumped into an adjoining house, before locking himself in a room. It was around 10 a.m. After hearing gun shots, the local police, unaware of what was happening, rushed to the spot. Deputy Superintendent of Police Amanullah Khan who along with his men had joined the operation provided further details:

"The suspect had locked himself up inside a room. We tried to talk to him for a good 30 minutes but there was silence from the other side. When efforts to open the door failed, we lobbed a teargas canister inside the room through smashed windowpanes. From the smoke-filled room emerged a young man, hands up and head slightly bowed. Completely unarmed, only a cell phone could be found on his body. But before we could talk to him, intelligence officials whisked him away, bundled him into a double-cabin pick-up with tinted glasses and drove him away".

According to well placed intelligence sources, Faraj is expected to be handed over to the FBI soon and is likely to be kept in a US detention center in Jordan or Morocco. Born in 1965, he was deeply connected with al-Qaeda's North African cells before becoming involved in Pakistan a few years ago. The North African cells are al-Qaeda's most preserved, and are believed to be the key to any future strikes on the United States. He was a trainer at al-Farooq camp in Afghanistan

during Taliban rule where he trained hundreds of Pakistani men to be sent to Kashmir to fight against Indian troops. The arrest of Faraj was followed three days later by the capture of 18 members of his network from different areas of NWFP.

Abu Faraj is believed to be an expert in not only explosives but also in urban guerrilla warfare. At Afghanistan's al-Farooq camp, being run by the ISI before the 9/11 terror attacks, Faraj's interaction with private Pakistani militants as well as the military men was deep and characterized by the fact that other than Pashtu, he was good at Pakistan's national language, Urdu, which is spoken in urban centers. His choice in marriage was a Pakistani woman. Faraj had been used as a

facilitator between al-Qaeda's cells in North Africa and their support system in the United Kingdom.

His first field operation was the assassination of the most trusted US ally in its war on terror – General Musharraf. The mission obviously involved selection of right people and the arrangement of finances to carry out the operation. Faraj was given the task due to his proven abilities and connections among Pakistani jehadis and members of the armed forces, some of whom participated in the two attempts on Musharraf's life in Rawalpindi in December 2003. Sources say Faraj was not only the mastermind but he also planted a bomb in one of the explosive-laden cars, used in the assassination attempts. Following these attempts, Libbi was tracked to the South Waziristan tribal area, followed by tips that he had moved to the Frontier Province, from where he has finally been captured.

The Pakistani and the US intelligence sleuths had tracked Osama bin Laden's deputy, Dr Zawahiri, and Tahir Yuldash, the political leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, to the Azam Warsak area in South Waziristan. But then they lost the trail. Similarly, Osama was pinpointed in the Shawal region that spans North Waziristan and Afghanistan. But the trail went dead again, forcing the intelligence agencies to revise their strategy and instead of searching for targets in the virtually inaccessible terrain of the Pak-Afghan tribal areas, they narrowed down their search to main Pakistani cities, where they had already captured some leading al-Qaeda leaders including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Abu Zubeyda.

According to some highly-placed intelligence sources in Islamabad, the FBI sleuths stationed in Pakistan had informed only last month none other than General Musharraf that his country continued to be a host of militant recruiting and training, and that Libbi keeps hiring local recruits to bolster the manpower of his terrorist organisation. An FBI communiqué handed over to Musharraf acknowledged that while al-Qaeda has lost many of its leading operational commanders, the fact remains that the terror group has not only survived the loss, but has also proved its ability to thrive in difficult circumstances. The FBI communiqué regretted that despite Pakistan's arrests, the tribal areas continue to provide a production line of new terrorists to al-Qaeda.

The FBI thus believed that if there is one country that matters most to al- Qaeda's future, it is Pakistan, where the fate of the last militants trained and inspired before the 9/11 attacks was being played out. The intelligence information gathered by the FBI and subsequently provided to Pakistan said most of the al-Qaeda fugitives on the run from Afghanistan and Pakistan were being sheltered by the heavily armed populace on Pak-Afghan border, where they are being trained in terror, under Libbi's command. The FBI further claimed that some of the al-Qaeda training camps have already been reactivated along the southeastern side of the Pak-Afghan border.

Soon after the Pakistani President received the FBI communiqué, the American commander of the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, Lt Gen David Barno stated [on April 18, 2005] that terrorists were infiltrating into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Islamabad should launch a fresh military operation against the remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda presently hiding in the Waziristan area. But the Peshawar Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain was quick to dismiss Barno's claim on April 20, 2005, describing it a highly irresponsible remark: "Lt. Gen. Barno should not have made that statement. It was a figment of his imagination. There is no bloody operation going on until we have the right intelligence", Safdar said.

Corps Commander Peshawar's statement was followed by Director General Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan's rejoinder: "No such military operation is being launched, and we decide for ourselves what needs to be done and when and where". Lt Gen David Barno made his statement during a meeting of Tripartite Commission of the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan, held in Islamabad on April 18, 2005. The General claimed during the meeting that the remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda were planning to stage some high visibility attacks over the next six to nine months, which would get them back on the scoreboard after suffering major strategic reversals. "The coming spring would therefore see a fresh operation in North Waziristan to nip their planned offensive in the bud", Barno was quoted as saying.

Then on May 3, 2005, General John Abizaid, the chief of the American Central Command, paid a surprised visit to Pakistan and held a detailed meeting with General Pervez Musharraf. According to well-placed government sources, the US General provided some specific intelligence information to General Musharraf that finally led to the capture of Abu Faraj Al-Libbi the same day -- April 3, 2005. Although capturing Faraj had been the top priority of the intelligence agencies ever since the arrest of his predecessor, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, finding him took on a new urgency with the discovery of surveillance reports on the hard drives of some al-Qaeda operatives arrested from Pakistan. Subsequent debriefings of over a dozen arrested militants revealed Libbi's name as the man responsible for the operational planning and execution of the al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

The material provided the US and the Pakistani intelligence agencies with a treasure trove of substance about al-Qaeda plans. The matter revealed that Libbi had not only orchestrated some major terrorist activities in Pakistan, including a suicide attack on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in June 2004, but he was also behind the coded messages sent to al-Qaeda sleeping cells in the United States and the United Kingdom, assisted by Naeem Noor Khan, a computer expert from Pakistan who was arrested from Lahore in July 2004, the provincial capital of the Punjab province. The deciphered messages revealed that Libbi had been coordinating pre-election (November 2004) terrorist acts in the US.

President Bush seems happier than even General Musharraf over the arrest of Abu Faraj, whom he has described as a top general of bin Laden and whose arrest he has hailed as a critical victory in the so-called war against terrorism. The American President was followed by Director Operation of the US Military's Joint Staff, Lt Gen James Conway: "Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden should worry that the capture of his operations chief by Pakistani forces will hasten his own death or capture. I think Osama Bin Laden should be very concerned that we are that much closer to him and his compatriots, wherever they are", Lt Gen James Conway was quoted as saying on May 7, 2005. The Bush administration, therefore, hopes against hope that with the seizure of his operational lieutenant, the luck of the fugitive al-Qaeda chief will too run out.

(Cobrapost News Features)