Concerning the Kalabagh dam controversy
By Kaleem Omar
General Pervez Musharraf
was right when he said five years ago that Pakistan urgently needs to build
more big dams to boost the country's water-storage capacity, citing the example
of Turkey which has built 40 dams on the Tigris River and other rivers over the
last three decades, while Pakistan, during roughly the same period, has built
only two: Mangla Dam on the River Jhelum (completed in 1968) and Tarbela Dam on
the River Indus (completed in 1974).
Addressing the editors of
Sindhi newspapers at Governor House in Karachi on July 14, 2000, Gen Musharraf
said: "If we take a decision right now to go ahead with the construction
of a dam, it will be completed in the year 2010, by which time the water
shortage (in the country) will rise to 6 million acre-feet, and by the year
2014 or 2015 the shortage will go up to 8 million to 10 million acre-feet.
Would it not be stupidity if we keep losing our water and our people keep
longing for it? Do we want to give our people a concept that they should go on
longing for water?"
The answer to that
question, of course, is that, no, we most certainly do not want our people to
go on facing water shortages, or go on living in a climate of perpetual
uncertainty about whether they will have enough water for their crops from one
year to the next. But the question that then arises is where should the next
big dam be built: at Kalabagh or at Bhasha?
Islamabad is no closer to
evolving a national consensus on the issue today than it was five years ago.
Punjab continues to press for building Kalabagh, while NWFP and Sindh continue
to oppose it, arguing that Bhasha would be a better option.
President Musharraf, for
his part, says that, eventually, both dams will have to be built to meet the
country's growing water needs.
The building of more dams
is vital not only for Pakistan's agriculture but also for the economy as a
whole since these dams would be dual-purpose dams, serving as both
water-storage reservoirs and hydroelectric dams for generating low-cost
electricity.
Pakistan is richly endowed
with hydroelectric potential. More than 30,000 MW of hydroelectric power
potential may be economically viable in the north of the country.
A large number of medium-
and large-sized hydroelectric projects have been studied to varying levels of
detail. During the course of the preparation of Wapda's National Power Plan in
1991-1994, updated cost estimates were prepared for major projects which had
been previously studied by other consultants to pre-feasibility level or
better.
For projects which had been
identified but not studied to at least pre-feasibility level, the National
Power Plan said that these identified projects had to be studied further before
they could be considered as potential additions to the system.
Prepared over a period of
30 months by a firm of Canadian consultants and Pakistani experts from Wapda,
the NPP was the most comprehensive exercise of its kind ever undertaken in
Pakistan, and was designed to meet country's power needs up to the year 2018.
In March 1994, however,
only three weeks before the plan was due to be submitted to the government, the
Benazir government came out with an energy policy of its own.
The main focus of the
energy policy was on setting up thermal power plants in the private sector. By
ignoring the National Power Plan and not incorporating its recommendations in
the 1994 energy policy, the Benazir government, in effect, negated the whole
purpose of the NPP exercise.
Most of the thermal
plants set up under the 1994 policy run on imported furnace oil, resulting in a
huge increase in Pakistan's oil import bill. Soaring international oil prices
have made the situation worse, with the oil import bill projected to rise to
more than $ 5 billion this year.
Since 1997 there has been
a five-fold increase in the price of imported furnace oil. This has further
pushed up Pakistan's electricity tariffs, making them amongst the highest in
the world.
High electricity tariffs
have led to cost increases across the board, fuelling inflation and making
Pakistani products less competitive in export markets. High electricity tariffs
have also made the problem of poverty-reduction more intractable.
As the final report of
the National Power Plan noted, six major hydroelectric projects have been
studied to pre-feasibility level or better.
Of these six, project
preparation for Kalabagh is in an advanced stage of readiness, while
Ghazi-Barotha -- a 1,450 megawatt hydel generation run-of-the-river project on
the Indus downstream of Tarbela was commissioned in December 2003. The other
four projects require additional study before a firm commitment to go ahead
with them can be made.
The proposed Kalabagh Dam
project is located on the Indus 192 km downstream of Tarbela Dam and 26 km
upstream of Jinnah Barrage, and immediately below the confluence with the Soan
River. Below the dam site, the Indus enters the plains and there are no further
opportunities for the creation of large reservoirs.
With a main dam height of
260 feet and a maximum retention level of 915 SPD, Kalabagh would have a gross
storage capacity of 7.9 million acre-feet, of which 6.1 million acre-feet would
be usable. The area of the reservoir, at retention level, would be 110,200
acres.
To be located on the left
bank of the river, the initial power plant at Kalabagh would have eight
turbines, each of 300 MW nominal capacity and 347 MW at full supply level, for
a total maximum capacity of 2,776 MW. The design makes provision for the later
addition of 4 more generation units. If all 12 units were installed, the
maximum output would be 4,164 MW at full supply level, or nearly as much as
Tarbela (3,478 MW) and Mangla (1,000 MW) put together.
One of the arguments put
forward by the proponents of Kalabagh is that its reservoir would
"increase the reliability of supply of irrigation water, and compensate
for the loss of storage at Tarbela, which is occurring due to siltation."
Since Tarbela's
completion in 1974, sedimentation to the extent of 2.6 million acre-feet in the
reservoir has reduced its gross storage capacity from 11.62 million acre-feet
to less than 9 million acre-feet.
Mangla, which originally
had a gross storage capacity of 5.35 million acre-feet, is also silting up,
though not as fast as Tarbela thanks to a watershed management and silt-trap
storage project in the catchment area above the dam.
Raising Mangla Dam's
height by 40 feet (work on which is now underway) is aimed at making up for the
loss of reservoir storage capacity due to silting.
Building a dam at
Kalabagh would compensate for the storage capacity lost due to the silting up
of the Tarbela reservoir. But this objective could also be achieved by building
a dam at Bhasha. A dam at Bhasha would also significantly reduce the rate of
siltation in the Tarbela reservoir, increasing its usable life by 30 years or
more. That's something Kalabagh cannot do because it would be downstream of
Tarbela.
The dam site of the
proposed Bhasha power project is located on the upper Indus River 314 km
upstream of Tarbela Dam and about 120 km downstream of the confluence with the
Gilgit River. The drainage area of the dam site is 152,000 square km.
The power plant at Bhasha
would comprise 12 turbines, each with an output of 205 MW at a design net head
of 145 meters. Power production at full supply level would be 3,360 MW, or 80
per cent of Kalabagh's. The Bhasha power project was studied by Montreal
Engineering Company of Canada in the early 1980s, and is described in their
1984 feasibility report. This was a detailed investigation, but the project
requires furthers study before the final design stage can commence.
An environmental
investigation of Bhasha has also been carried out. Preliminary studies and a
reconnaissance mission in the early 1990s by experts from the Asian Development
Bank concluded that the environmental impact of building a hydroelectric dam
there would not be severe.