The Conflict at Siachen |
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The human and economic costs of sustaining a two-decade
long bloody conflict over the possession of the geographically remote and climatically
inhospitable Siachen Glacier continues to bleed both Pakistan and India dry
despite several rounds of talks between two nuclear-armed neighbours to
resolve the dispute, variedly described as a war on the rooftop of the world. The two-day Islamabad talks between Indian and Pakistani
defence secretaries on resolving the Siachen issue have again ended inconclusively.
This was the third dialogue session since the January 6, 2004 Islamabad
Declaration that kicked off the normalization process between the two sides.
But at the end, a bald statement merely repeated the diplomatic doublespeak
for deadlock: that the two sides held "frank and constructive
discussions" and would continue to talk — without specifying any new
date. In real terms, therefore, the position, if it has not actually
regressed, remains the same as the one that prevailed when the then Indian
premier, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, had come to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto in July 1989. Originally known as Saicher Gharni, the Siachen means the
place of roses (Sia-rose, chen-place of). Since April 1984, when the Indian army
carried out a clandestine operation code-named "Meghdoot" and established
permanent posts at the Siachen Glacier, the two nuclear-armed neighbours have
confronted each other militarily for control over the icy wasteland and its
approaches in the eastern Karakoram mountain range, adjacent to the borders of
India, Pakistan and China. The longest-running armed conflict between two
regular armies in the twentieth century, the Siachen conflict has resulted in
thousands of casualties from both sides, primarily because of adverse climatic
conditions and harsh terrain. This is despite the fact that the leaderships
in India and Pakistan acknowledge the human and economic costs of the Siachen
dispute. According to careful estimates by Pakistani defence
experts, to maintain three battalions at the icy wasteland of Siachen,
Islamabad spends Rs. 15 million a day, which makes Rs. 450 million a month
and Rs. 5.4 billion a year. On the other hand, the deployment of seven battalions
at the Glacier costs India Rs. 50 million a day, Rs. 1.5 billion a month and
Rs. 30 billion a year. On average, the experts say, one Pakistani soldier is killed every third day on
the Glacier, showing approximately 100 casualties every year on average.
Similarly, one Indian soldier is killed every other day on the Glacier, at an
annual average of 180 casualties. According to unofficial figures, over 2,200
Pakistani soldiers lost their lives on the Glacier between 1984 and 2004 as
against over 4,000 Indian casualties. The cost of a loaf of bread that would be less than a
rupee in the Kashmir Valley is estimated by the Times of India to be worth
Rs10,000 (US$217) by the time it reaches Indian soldiers on Siachen. The
fight for the Siachen Glacier involves territory claimed by both states but not
controlled by either until the mid-1980s. In twenty years of fighting, India
and Pakistan have chosen to keep the war almost entirely out of the press. It is a war neither side wants
to fight. Yet, it has lasted for two long decades. Thousands of soldiers from
Pakistan and India stand muzzle to muzzle all along the Glacier, the disputed
ice chunk between two hostile neighbours. India controls about two-thirds of
the Glacier besides commanding two of the three passes while Pakistan
occupies the Gyong La Pass, which overlooks Shyok and Nubra river valleys and
India's access to the Glacier from the Leh district in Ladakh. At 5,472 meters above sea level, the Siachen Glacier is
located in the Karakoram mountain region, which has some of the highest peaks
in the world. The northern mountains of the Glacier mark the watershed between
the Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Bereft of vegetation, the
Glacier happens to be one of the world's most inhospitable regions where
temperature hovers around minus 40 degree centigrade. If bare skin touches
metal, it bounds as if with glue and can be torn off. In winters, strong
winds from Central Asia can further bring down the temperature to minus 50 degrees.
The Glacier receives 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 10 meters of snow
in winter alone. Blizzards can reach speeds up to 150 knots (nearly 300 kilometers
per hour). The Indian army controls Siachen heights, holding on to
the tactical advantage of high ground. But the Pakistan army is slightly
better off since it occupies smaller portion of the Glacier, and its
road-head is only 20 km away from the farthest post. Indian troops on the
other hand are stationed about 80 km away from the road-head and have to be maintained
entirely by air, which is not only cost prohibitive but also risky because of
the adverse weather conditions most of the times. Interestingly, the
Pakistani soldiers cannot go up to the Glacier and the Indian forces cannot
come down. While the Pakistani troops stationed on the Glacier are
confronted with a less forbidding terrain as compared to their Indian adversaries,
their military presence forces Indians to retain their troops on the more
elevated and hazardous mountain passes, resulting in higher attrition rates
because of the dangerous altitude, weather and terrain. Daily existence at
the Glacier is simply agonizing due to frostbiting and other such
tribulations. Over 95 per cent of the casualties at the Glacier are because
of extremely cold weather and forbidding terrain while only five percent fall
in combat. The Indian casualty rate is a staggering 63 per cent – of every
two soldiers sent up to the Glacier, one will be a casualty. The Pakistanis are no better off since they lose fewer men
to the hostile elements and more to the Indian firing. Pakistani authorities had
admitted in 1994 that their non-combat casualties since 1984 accounted for
over 80 per cent of total attrition. Pakistani positions are, for the most
part, at a lower altitude in the Glacier area, ranging between 9,000 to
15,000 feet (some are at a much higher altitude such as Conway Saddle, at 17,200 feet, which
controls doorway to the Glacier). Over the last two decades, Pakistan has
tried many times to displace the Indian forces, but had to retreat each time.
The Indian troops have to do nothing but sit tight and periodically repel a
Pakistani assault. Despite wearing five layers of clothing, paratroopers
shiver as they wait to board an air force transport at the world's highest
air base at Leh. The AN-32A planes approach the stark runway at Leh in snowy mist,
pushed by tail winds. The pilots navigate the steep mountains by sight.
Higher on the icy Himalayan peaks, helicopter pilots battle downdrafts as
they land on helipads to deliver precious supplies or rescue injured
soldiers. The pilots stay on the ground no more than 30 seconds for fear of being shot by the enemy troops.
Soldiers brought down to base camp often suffer hearing, eyesight and memory
loss because of prolonged use of oxygen masks. Many lose eyes, hands or feet
to frostbite. The roots of the conflict over Siachen lie in the
non-demarcations on the western side of the map beyond a grid point known as
NJ 9842. Hostilities between India and Pakistan over ownership of the Glacier
date back to the first Indo-Pak war of 1948, over the territorial dispute of
Jammu & Kashmir. A Cease-Fire Line (CFL) was established as a result of
the 1949 Indo-Pak agreement that concluded the war in Jammu & Kashmir.
The CFL ran along the international Indo-Pak border and then north and
northeast until map grid-point NJ 9842, located near the Shyok River at the
base of the Saltoro mountain range. Because no Indian or Pakistani troops
were present in the geographically inhospitable northeastern areas beyond NJ
9842, the CFL was not delineated as far as the Chinese border. Both sides
agreed, in vague language, that the CFL extends to the terminal point, NJ
9842, and "thence north to the Glaciers". After the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the Tashkent agreement
resulted in troop withdrawals to positions along the 1949 CFL. No attempt was
made to extend the CFL further. Following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with
India, the Simla Agreement of 1972 established a new Line of Control (LoC) as
a result of the December 1971 cease-fire. The Siachen Glacier region, where
no fighting had taken place, was left un-delineated, and no attempt was made
to clarify the position of the LoC beyond NJ 9842. The LoC was merely
described as moving from Nerlin (inclusive to India), Brilman (inclusive to
Pakistan), up to Chorbat La in the Turtok sector. Since the Siachen Glacier region falls within the
un-delineated territory beyond the last defined section of the LoC, map
grid-point NJ 9842, Indian and Pakistani territorial claims are based on
their respective interpretations of the vague language contained in the 1949 and
1972 agreements. Pakistan draws a straight line in a northeasterly direction
from NJ 9842 up to the Karakoram Pass on its boundary with China. India
instead draws a north-northwest line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of
the Saltoro Range, a southern offshoot of the Karakoram Range. As things stand today, neither of the two sides is ready
to alter the status quo on Siachen. Pakistan claims the Siachen Glacier is a
part of the country's northern areas, over which it enjoyed continued administrative
control since her independence from the British Raj in 1947. On the other
hand, India stresses that the un-demarcated area was never in the Pakistani
control as per the Simla agreement wording of 1949. But Pakistan cites the
boundary agreement of 1963 with China to support its case. India is determined to keep the Glacier since its northern
mountains divide the Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Whoever owns
the Glacier controls the Shyok and Nubra valleys, as well as the region bordering
China. India fears that Pakistan's control of the Glacier would endanger the
security of Ladakh in particular and the state of Jammu & Kashmir in
general. The Indians further believe that China and Pakistan want to occupy
the Siachen to secure a common border with China to facilitate a closer
military link. Although Islamabad had affected its control over the Siachen
Glacier since the 1960s, it did not establish any permanent post because of
the harsh climatic conditions there. However, scouting missions kept climbing
to the Glacier from time to time. The Indians were first to deploy their troops and
establish permanent posts at the Siachen Glacier in April 1984, through a
major air-mobile operation, code-named "Meghdoot". The Indian army
quietly moved an advance unit from the Kumaon regiment to occupy key mountain
Passes and successfully established permanent posts at the Siachen heights in
violation of all the previous agreements reached between the two countries. As a result of operation "Meghdoot", two out of
three passes on the Siachen – Sia La and Bilfond La -- came under India's
control, while the third pass -- Gyong La – remained under Pakistan's
control. The Indian army is permanently stationed all along the 110-km long
Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), backed by a formidable array of surface weapons,
including anti-aircraft guns, missiles and artillery. The Pakistani arsenal
is comparable: sniper rifles, machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aircraft
missiles, rocket launchers and artillery pieces. Though the two armies used
to clash on the Glacier quite often, Pakistan announced a ceasefire in
November 2003 as part of a border truce with India. With the installation of
the Congress-led coalition government in India, both the countries are once
again talking to each other on all the contentious issues, including that of the
Siachen. For the first time in the past twenty years, the two
countries decided last year to discuss the Siachen issue at the defence
secretaries' level. Pakistan's defence secretary Lt. Gen. (retd) Hamid Nawaz
Khan visited India in August 2004 to meet his Indian counterpart Ajai Vikram
Singh, who led his country's team at the negotiations in Hyderabad House of
New Delhi. During these talks, which remained inconclusive, members from both
the teams reportedly questioned the terrible waste of human lives in a
so-called war of prestige and urged that it must be brought to an end. During
the second round of talks held in Islamabad on May 26-27, 2005, the Indian delegation
was headed by Defence Secretary Ajay Vikram Singh while Defence Secretary Lt
Gen (retd) Tariq Wasim Ghazi led the Pakistani side. While Pakistan proposed a negotiated withdrawal of troops
from the disputed region to the 1980 position, the Indian side was keen to
get the whole area declared as demilitarised zone before vacating it. Yet, no
agreement could be reached between the two sides, primarily because India's
six-point proposal, starting with cessation of "cartographic aggression"
and culminating in the "withdrawal of forces", was dramatically in
conflict with Pakistan's two-point formula of first withdrawing forces and
then delineating an extension of the Line of Control (LoC) beyond NJ 9842 (Latitude 98 degrees East and
Longitude 42 degrees north). So divergent were the views on both sides that
no meeting point was possible. Analysts say one way to look at the problem is to shrug
one's shoulders and say this un-declared war can go on even as India and Pakistan
normalise on other fronts. Fair enough. But does this logic take into account
the plight of the troops on both sides and even the bigger logic of
normalisation itself? No. There are various proposals, including some very
good non-official ones, on the table. It is time both sides got out of the
old grooves and began to look at the issue in the larger political context
rather than simply in the narrow military sense. A more earnest attempt
should be made to at least agree on withdrawal to less harsh and more
civilized positions and to pledge that no patrols in uncharted territory will
be carried out by either side. This too should be seen as a
confidence-building measure.
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