The Taliban are Regrouping |
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Despite the fall of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan way back in October 2001, the US-led Allied
Forces have failed to uproot the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan
who have gained strength and are getting stronger with every assing day after regrouping and
reorganizing their resistance movement in the war torn country. According to
Islamabad-based diplomatic circles considered close toAmerican intelligence
sleuths stationed in Pakistan, the Taliban and their al-Qaeda aides, backed
by new volunteers from Pakistan, are reuniting and expanding their area of
operations in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, which were their
former stronghold. The diplomatic sources say the recent visits of Lt Gen
David Barno, the former commander of the US troops in Afghanistan, and the
chief of American Central Command, General John Abizaid, to Islamabad and
their insistence that Pakistan should launch fresh military operation against
the al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the Pakistani territory, were motivated
by a new realization that the Taliban problem was back to square one. Since the fall of the
Taliban regime, the US military operations in Afghanistan have passed through
three phases. In the first phase, the government set up by the Taliban, with
its administrative headquarters in Kabul and its religious head office in
Kandahar was replaced by a provisional government headed by Hamid Karzai, an
educated Pashtun enjoying confidence of the US and other Western countries. In the second phase, the
training and other terrorist infrastructure of al-Qaeda and Taliban in the
southern and eastern Afghanistan were destroyed through aerial and ground
action. In the third phase, efforts were initiated to restore law and order
and governance in the rural areas liberated from the control of the Taliban
militia and to build infrastructure of a liberal democracy in the country in
the form of a constitution paving the way for free and fair elections.
However, as things stand, it appears that the Taliban and the al-Qaeda
fighters have reunited themselves in Afghanistan, mostly along the Pak-Afghan
border areas. The social, geographical and political characteristics of the
whole of this tribal belt favour the Taliban fighters, and the Pakistani,
American and Afghan authorities just cannot control the Taliban in this
specific region. The guerilla war in Afghanistan has really taken shape.
Earlier, between October 7, 2001, and December 2001, heavy US precision
bombing had coerced the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters to leave their
controlling positions and disperse to places where they could find a shelter.
Osama bin Laden and
Mullah Omar's decision to retreat from Kabul and Kandahar forced most of
their commanders to hide themselves in Pakistani tribal areas. Ordinary Taliban
foot soldiers easily melted into the civilian Afghan population. Several
disposed of their black turbans and joined the new Afghan administration.
Many of them chose to go back to their tribes and resumed a routine life as
ordinary citizens. However, the situation in Afghanistan has been
deteriorating since the beginning of 2005. Increasing numbers of better
trained, better equipped and better-led Taliban cadres operating from
sanctuaries in Pakistan have stepped up their hit-and-run raids into southern
and eastern Afghanistan in order to demoralise the newly-raised army and
police of the Hamid Karzai government in the hope of thereby inducing
large-scale desertions. The Taliban resistance movement has apparently chosen
Zabul, Spin Boldak and Hilmand as the areas where they have to re-establish
their authority. These districts are situated all along the mountainous
terrain, which best serves a guerilla campaign. This terrain leads to safe
routes that go across areas demarcated by the Durand Line, which
separates Pakistan from Afghanistan, and exists only on the map. Practically, there is no
clear demarcation of the border and there are dozens of villages located on
the Line, part in Afghanistan and part in Pakistan. The people on both sides
of the Durand Line belong to the same tribes (the Noor Zai and the Achakzai)
and have traditionally moved freely on both sides of the divide for
centuries. These are the circumstances that make it possible for the Taliban
and al-Qaeda fighters to attack their targets on Afghan soil, using the
mountainous terrain to strategic advantage, and then melting into the
villages situated on the Pak-Afghan border areas. The Pakistani tribal areas
thus provide natural strategic depth to the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. Not only are the Taliban
primed in the latest techniques in guerrilla warfare today, they have also
got their hands on fresh resources, in terms of personnel and supplies -
which the Allied Forces had believed were choked off. The US intelligence
sleuths believe the Taliban are becoming more sophisticated in their tactics
besides attempting to reinvigorate and resurrect their movement. In a major
shift away from classic Afghan guerilla warfare tactics in which a small
number of fighters carry out a
hit-and-run attack and then disperse into the mountains, the Taliban
fighters, during several recent battles with the "enemy forces" in
the southern and eastern Afghanistan, concentrated their forces and tried to
hold on to strategic positions, particularly in the southeast of the country
on the borders of Pakistan. After the invasion of
Afghanistan, the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters used to launch attacks on
the Allied Forces and the Northern Allied troops in groups of 10 to 15 men.
However, as things stand, they are launching attacks in groups ranging from
100 to 150 men. Yet the fact remains that the Afghan fighters have already
suffered massive casualties in the first two weeks of May 2005 while battling
against the Allied and the Afghan government troops. In some of the bloodiest
fighting since the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the coalition
forces have engaged several large groups of militants who have tried to hold
on to strategic ground. The Allied troops have been able to call in air
strikes by the American and the British warplanes against the concentrated
Taliban forces with devastating results. Resultantly, over 100 Taliban
fighters have been killed in battles across southern and eastern Afghanistan while
nine Afghan soldiers, two US Marines and one Afghan police officer have lost
their lives. According to Pakistani
intelligence sources, with Allied Forces confined mainly to the capital of
Kabul, the Taliban and the al-Qaeda fighters have made gains elsewhere in the
country. In September 2003, the Taliban fighters had captured four southern
and southwestern districts in Afghanistan – a major success that was
announced by Hamed Agha, the military spokesman of the Taliban. Though the
Taliban forces had little trouble in capturing these cities, they were unable
to maintain their control upon the arrival of the American air power. Yet
that fact does not conflict with the overall strategy of the Taliban, which
is to get the Americans involved in a costly war of attrition. The Pakistani
intelligence sources added that as the Taliban have changed their tactics,
not only are US forces being attacked, but so are Afghan police officers, aid
workers and midlevel officials. The United Nations has reported last week that
attacks on aid workers, most of them Afghans, have intensified significantly
since the beginning of May 2005. The intermittent assaults have made the
territory in the south and east safe one day and dangerous the next. As a
result, the United Nations' officials say, the pace of reconstruction and
investment is slowing and the populace, which is almost all ethnic Pashtun,
is becoming more alienated from the government in Kabul and its American
backers.On the other hand, the American intelligence findings say that while
operating from their safe havens in neighboring Pakistan and aided by
militant Muslim groups, there Taliban have allied them with Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, the chief of the Hizb-e-Islami, who enjoys the hidden support of
the Pakistani establishment. The Americans believe that the morale and
fighting capability of the Taliban have been bolstered because of the
Hizb-e-Islami reinforcements. The Taliban have also launched a bimonthly
newsletter – Masone (Appearance) besides distributing leaflets, in the same
fashion that the mujahideen communicated with the Afghan public during the
Soviet invasion. In yet another significant move, the Taliban leaders
recently acquired signatures from some leading Afghan clerics on a statement
calling for jehad against the US-led forces. The Taliban have already
launched an unprecedented campaign to win money and support from Muslim
militants outside Afghanistan in a resurgence marked by a spate of roadside
killings, military ambushes and public statements boasting of their
successes. After remaining relatively quiet for a longer period of time, a
horde of Taliban spokesmen have been turning up on Arab televisions and the
Pakistani media. Many of them have started making direct phone calls to the
international press, including The Associated Press. The calls have increased
in step with a bolder, bloodier insurgency that has shaken faith in the
Washington-backed Afghan government's ability to assert its control, and the
US military's resolve at crushing the rebels. By January 2005, the Taliban
resistance was in full swing, before Mullah Omar decided to change the course
of the entire resistance movement. The Taliban supreme
leader held an important meeting with his commanders in February 2005 to plan
their future strategy against the Allied Forces. The decision was made in
consultation with Arab fighters, and the new strategy was based on the
following key points: That the Taliban are very well integrated into the
Afghan population, and they have established good contacts between
themselves; that since Iraqi resistance has fully engaged the US, the Afghan
guerrillas can take their time to further build up their strength; that the
present low-key situation will be exploited for a psychological war: the US
knows that the enemy is alive and kicking, but they do not know its next
moves; that the Taliban will execute sporadic operations, but will not
respond to any US reaction; that the situation will keep the US and its
allies permanently on edge, and as public support for the Taliban grows, new
alliances will be forged with figures such as Ismail Khan, the sacked
governor of Herat province, General Rashid Dostum and other disenchanted
segments of Afghan society. Ultimately the resistance
hopes to completely erode all support for Karzai and his US backers, at which
time the Taliban could strike. As a part of this strategy the Taliban decided
to shut down all its war bases in Pakistani territory. As one contact noted,
the message for the government of Pakistan is "see you soon in
Kabul". According to US intelligence sources, it was decided during the
meeting (presided over by Mullah Mohammad Omar) to activate the Iraq-style
resistance in Afghanistan. The participants of the meeting were unanimous
that the central command of the Iraqi resistance has already been eliminated
and various groups, mostly Islamists, are engaged in guerrilla activity on an
independent basis. And they were convinced that this decentralization was the
guarantee of their security and successful clandestine operations. Therefore,
it was decided to adopt an identical tactic in Afghanistan. Soon after the
meeting that was held on the Pak-Afghan tribal belt, all prominent Taliban
commanders withdrew from the battlefield, with the most prominent ones --
Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, taking refuge in the tribal areas
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the rest opting to stay with the local
Afghan population. The withdrawal of the Taliban commanders caused a lull in
the resistance, which was the aim. A new generation of mujahideen not known
in Afghanistan, including Arabs, Pakistanis, Afghans and others, was selected
in the meantime and kept at remote positions. The Americans say the members
of the new generation are all familiar with the latest guerrilla tactics and
oriented only for specific missions. For instance, a small group was assigned
to disrupt oil supplies in Spin Boldak. They were specifically launched to
hit that target, and when they achieved their goal they scattered to await
the next assignment. Similarly, another group was assigned to blow up a
helicopter in Ghazni. They were given maps, flight routines etc, and once
they achieved their mission, they dispersed. Keeping in mind these instances,
it appears that unlike in the past, the Taliban movement is now
target-oriented rather than reliant on the random attacks it previously
adopted. And there are only a few hundred of these small teams whose initial
targets are important Afghan cities like Khost, Ghazni, Kandahar and
Jalalabad, with June 2005 earmarked for attacks in Kabul. The meeting presided over
by Mullah Omar reportedly decided to establish the central office of the
Taliban in Asadabad, near the Pakistani border, besides setting up several
training camps in Parachinar and Miran Shah, both located in Pakistan. Being
mobile camps, these can be moved quickly according to required needs. Mullah
Omar was made to head the main military committee, backed by two of his
commanders, Mullah Dadullah and Ahktar Usmani. During the same meeting,
Afghanistan was divided into five operational zones, whose command was given
to Saiful Muslameen. The zonal commanders include famed Pashtun warlord
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, leader of the Hizb-e-Islami, in Kunhar, Jalalabad,
Kabul, Logar and Gazni. While the command of Khost, Paktia and Paktika was
given to Maulana Jalaludin Haqqani, Gardez was placed under Mullah Saifullah
Mansoor's command. In Khost, Paktia, Paktika
and Gazni, the Taliban fighters seek to inflict terror on the Allied Forces.
They do not control any significant areas in these provinces, but gather in
the Northern and Southern Waziristan area of Pakistan as well as in the
Kurram Agency to execute strikes across the border and then retreat to the
relative safety of Pakistani territory. Once again, they hide in the
mountains in areas where the nebulous Durand Line separates Pakistan from
Afghanistan. Against the backdrop of a strong re-emergence of the Taliban
across south and southeastern Afghanistan, especially when Kabul is claiming
to have split the Taliban, a powerful operation has been planned in a
specific belt along the Pak-Afghan border that starts in the North Waziristan
tribal area in Pakistan and runs south as far as the Afghan province of
Zabul, where the Taliban rose against feuding warlords and seized control of
most major Afghan cities without much bloodshed before taking power in Kabul
in 1996. Though Pakistan government denies, the military sources say that
after the May 3, 2005 capture of al-Qaeda's chief operational commander, Abu
Faraj Al Libbi, from the border areas of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army has
already launched a fresh military operation in North Waziristan. However, it
is unlike the ones adopted in South Waziristan in the past to root out
Taliban and other foreign fighters. The blueprint for the
fresh operation which is aimed at specific targets, rather than broad
actions, was reportedly prepared on the advice of US intelligence, which
pin-pointed certain areas in Miranshah, Data Khail and Mir Ali town. The
first casualty of the fresh military operation was a senior al-Qaeda
operative, Haitham al-Yemeni, who was killed on the night of May 8, 2005 near
Mir Ali town in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan,
after his car became the target of a missile fired by a CIA predator aircraft
over Pakistan. Quoting US intelligence officials, the ABC News reported
exclusively on May 13 2005 that the senior al-Qaeda operative was killed by a
missile fired from a CIA predator aircraft over Pakistan earlier this week. Similarly, there are
confirmed reports that the Pakistani troops, while acting on an American
intelligence tip off, raided the North Waziristan house of Afghan commander
Jalaluddin Haqqani and arrested his elder son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. Jalaluddin
is a legendary mujahideen commander from the Afghan resistance against the
Soviets in the 1980s and a key figure in the present Taliban resistance. The
Americans say Sirajuddin happens to be the main contact in the Taliban's
latest strategy of guerrilla warfare which revolves around recruiting youths
to be given specialized training for targeted attacks. According to US
intelligence sources, apart from targeting the Taliban, there is another
reason for the latest offensive in the North Waziristan region. Intelligence gathered from local tribals by
US operatives and shared with their Pakistan counterparts suggests that in
the past several weeks top al-Qaeda figure Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri had been
sighted in different places, including Birmal (in Paktika province in
Afghanistan, near North Waziristan) and in Zabul province, which is today's
epicenter of the Taliban resistance. Moreover, there are unconfirmed reports
that Taliban leader Mullah Omar was also seen in Zabul, as was the Taliban's
top commander, Mullah Dadullah. The presence of these men, along with Dr.
Zawahiri, suggests that meetings took place in Zabul aimed at escalating the
level of the resistance. The Karzai government in Afghanistan has already
extended an amnesty offer to the rank-and-file of the Taliban and al-Qaeda
fighters and commanders in a bid to undermine support for the fugitive
Taliban leader Mullah Omar and al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. Several local
commanders and scores of their Taliban fighters have accepted the amnesty
offer since the beginning of May 2005. To cut the long story short, the
resurgent Taliban present a serious threat across the south and east of
Afghanistan. On the other hand, America's continued reluctance to act against
Pakistan and make it pay a prohibitive price for helping the Taliban
terrorists is coming in the way of an effective counter-terrorism strategy.
Encouraged by the US reluctance, General Musharraf's military regime
continues to keep the Taliban alive and active in the hope of using them to
retrieve the lost Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.
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