Aid In Pakistan

Pakistan's interest was to enhance its military capability vis a vis India while the American interest was to equip Pakistan to a level where it would prove to be a potent bulwark state against the communist threat

By Tahir Jamil

The US aid (military and economic) to Pakistan has been based primarily on the posture that the United States of America assumed after World War II to contain the expansion of the USSR influence -- consequently, Communism. In the wake of this development on the international horizon, Pakistan's geo-strategic location led America to recognise its importance. On the other hand, a constant threat to its security from neighbouring India made it imperative for Pakistan to develop long-term relations with a super power that could cater for its defense and economic needs. The only viable option available was USA.

Initially, a great deal of confusion prevailed regarding the future discourse of the country's foreign policy. The marginalised popular voices put emphasis on Pan-Islamism, as Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam. But the real power players -- for example, Ayub Khan, Sikandar Mirza and Governor General Ghulam Muhammad -- were in favour of developing cordial and long-term relations with the US.

In his book, Pakistan: A Modern History, Ian Talbot -- Professor of History at Southampton University, UK -- opines that the removal of Khawaja Nazimuddin, the second prime minister of Pakistan, was also because of the differences that he had developed with the given troika on the issue of foreign policy. From that point onwards, there started an epochal relationship between the key power players in Pakistan and USA that was to later on affect the entire course of our foreign policy.

The third Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad, paid a visit to the USA in 1853. The US declared Pakistan its frontline ally in South Asia against communism in 1954. Since then the American aid has been pouring in -- in both military/defense and economic categories. Immediately, a six-point agreement called 'Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement' was signed. Pakistan got aid in the form of equipment and material to modernise its inventory, apart from an exchange of technical information regarding defense. Pakistan also received US government personnel whose job was to discharge their responsibilites in the territory as stated by the agreement. In return, Pakistan was bound to support the American initiatives in dealing with peace-threatening issues. Pakistan received military assistance worth 1.5 billion dollars as well as economic aid. It was obvious that America trusted Pakistan to play a very important role in the cold war setting.

This relationship was further strengthened when Pakistan signed on SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) in 1954 and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) -- then called Baghdad Pact -- in 1957. Pakistan's all-out reliance on the US military and economic aid was because of its apprehensions regarding India, considered a potent threat to its security. Pakistan was left with the issue of Kashmir and, later, it proved to be one major fault-line in Pak-India relations. Pakistan's interest was to enhance its military capability vis a vis India while the American interest was to equip Pakistan to a level where it would prove to be a potent bulwark state against the communist threat. This commonality of interest clashed whenever there emerged a conflict between India and Pakistan.

The dimension of US relations with Pakistan can be gauged from the way this aid was channeled. In Ayub Khan's era, Pakistan continued with its pro-US policy and, hence, aid was disbursed to it in both economic and military categories. For the first time, American president John F Kennedy accepted the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan as the international border. But the relations began to get strained after the Indo-China war of 1962. The US supported India as the latter shared its democratic ideals. Pakistan felt it had been betrayed by the US. As a result, the balance tilted towards India that was against the interests of Pakistan.

Again, in the wars of 1965 and 1971, no military -- let alone diplomatic -- assistance was afforded to Pakistan. Both the US and Britain stayed neutral. America severed its cordial ties with Pakistan. The Ayub era that had been lauded as the decade of development, thanks to the economic and military assistance from the USA, ended in mayhem.

It can be safely inferred from the discussion above that both military and economic aid was considered crucial for uplifting Pakistan. In the Ayub era, the Americans helped us settle outstanding issues with our neighbouring countries (chiefly Afghanistan and India). America helped us substantially to build infrastructure viable enough to support our economic development. But we gave central importance to our military and strategic needs at the cost of our economic development. Our authorities badly failed to bargain with the US over economic benefits. Unfortunately, what was accrued in terms of economic assistance was used less cautiously. It was because of the attitude of the authorities towards a virtual, participatory popular governance. The authorities have a strong mistrust to the politician and the political process. What we observe that the national unity that could be forged through the introduction of a well-functioning political system and distributive economic policies was missing.

The cordiality of relations that we enjoyed with the US could have been converted into Pakistan's economic strength. Strategic relations are short-lived and economic relations have a long life. But Pakistani authorities shifted core to the periphery. The main reason can be centralisation policy of the military regime and the it is the obvious outcome of the phenomenon.

While dealing with a debate on foreign policy the question of morality cannot be inserted. Contradictions in American attitude in dealing with its own citizens and with the rest of the world is often questioned. It can be addressed in this way that our foreign policy had (in post-9/11 the situation has changed) little to do directly with American people. Their participation in the political process is directed from the analysis of how much benefits they are to get from the policies of the government. Moreover, through a well functioning representative system, the American people do have a substantial say in the formulation of government policies. But in the case of Pakistan, the policies -- whatever crucial they are to the sovereignty of the country -- are made out of the whims of the authorities.

Despite all endeavours made by the authorities in the name of development and strengthening the country's strategic position, Pakistan is in a compromising position which is much more serious than it ever was.

Courtesy: The News Pakistan