Rounded Rectangle: Cobrapost News Features │Uploaded On July 4 2008
 

 

 


Politics Of Constitutionalism

 

Did the Murree-Bhurban declaration, and subsequent events, expose the dangers of arranged marriages or did it expose the PPP as a treacherous lover?

 

By Faisal Siddiqi

 

What is Asif Ali Zardari and the PPP up to in relation to the issue of the restoration of the judges is the million dollar question? There are various answers given by the anti-PPP and pro-restoration groups. Some argue that Asif Ali Zardari, Pervez Musharraf and the Americans are part of a deal which involves the retention of Pervez Musharraf and as a consequence, the non-restoration of the deposed judges. Others argue that, irrespective of what happens to Musharraf in the future, Zardari doesn't want to restore the judges at all because he thinks that they will strike down the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) 2007, and deny him the benefits of his alleged 'corrupt' practices. The common element in both these answers is that it reduces this political problem to the personality of Asif Zardari and his personal problems.

 

Without denying the relevance of the leadership of Asif Ali Zardari in understanding this political problem, I propose to argue in this article that the issue of the restoration of the judges vis-a-vis the PPP and Asif Zardari is a political, and not a personal, problem, and the actions of Asif Zardari and the PPP in relation to this issue needs to be understood within the context of the PPP as a ruling political party and the post Feb 18, 2008, emergent political process, and not in terms of the personality, personal views and self-interest of Zardari.

 

Musharraf constructed a post-Nov 3, 2007, 'legal' framework whose purpose was to legally secure his position as a constitutional president. First, by installing his own superior judiciary. Second, the Supreme Court under the PCO, headed by the Chief Justice, Abdul Hameed Dogar, under PCO, in the 'Tika Iqbal Muhammad Khan case' validated his post-Nov 2, 2007, actions and orders. Third, through the Constitution (Amendment and Second Amendment) Orders, 2007, constitutional amendments were 'inserted' in the constitution to secure his presidency [Article 44 was amended], to make it practically impossible to restore the non-functional judges Article 270C was amended and to protect and indemnify his post-Nov 2, 2007, actions and orders a new Article 270AAA was inserted.

 

The political strategy of Musharraf was clear. He knew that a new legal game was about to begin in which the constitution, judgments of the superior courts and the superior courts will be key strategic tools. Therefore, like any good dictator, his political strategy was to, in advance, manipulate and to rig all three of these strategic tools. But he also knew that a new political player i.e. the elected representatives of the people, are entering this new legal game. Therefore, as an incentive and gift to his alleged new political partners i.e. PPP, the NRO was also given protection through his aforementioned three strategic tools. The Supreme Court under PCO in the 'Tika Iqbal Muhammad Khan Case' upheld the enforceability of, and his constitution amendment [new Article 270AAA] protected, NRO. It looked like a marriage made in heaven.

 

But then came the romantic love affair of the Murree-Bhurban declaration of March 9, 2008. As examined in detail in one of my earlier articles, the Murree-Bhurban declaration recognised that the restoration of the judges was a political, and not a legal, problem.

 

There were four foundations of the Murree-Bhurban declaration. First, it accepted that the deposed judges [and not the judiciary] will be restored to their Nov 2, 2007, position. In other words, it was silent about the PCO judiciary. Second, it recognised that there were no legal or constitutional obstacles to the restoration of these judges because it refused to recognise the legality of the above-mentioned constitutional amendments which included the constitutional protection of the NRO, also made by Musharraf, the legality of the judgment in the 'Tika Iqbal Muhammad Khan Case' and the PCO judiciary as the sole judiciary.

 

In short, the PPP refused to recognise the legality of the post-Nov 2, 2007, actions and orders of Musharraf.

 

Third, a political decision was made to take on a political conflict with Musharraf. Fourth, in terms of tactics, the methodology of a parliamentary resolution and the time frame of 30 days was to be adopted. To further shatter the broken heart of Musharraf, on the first day of the session of National Assembly, one of the senior members of the PPP made a statement on the floor of the house that they don't recognise the post-Nov 2, 2007, constitutional amendments made by Musharraf (which included the NRO).

 

Did the Murree-Bhurban declaration, and subsequent events, expose the dangers of arranged marriages or did it expose the PPP as a treacherous lover? Or did it simply emphasise the fact that an understanding of the politics of the PPP as a political party could not be reduced simply to the NRO, 2007.

 

But the judges were not restored through a parliamentary resolution within 30 or even 60 days. Did this signify the end of the romantic love affair of the Murree-Bhurban declaration and the revival of the alleged arranged marriage with Pervez Musharraf? Sadly, politics, like life, is hardly a boring and repetitive affair. Therefore, another bomb shell in the form of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Bill, 2008 was dropped by the PPP.

 

In relation to Musharraf, it contains the mother of all rejected marriage proposals, as it refuses to recognise the legality of the post-Nov 2, 2007 actions and orders. This is because the Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2008 refuses to recognise the post-Nov 3, 2007, constitutional amendments made by Musharraf, which amendments included a new Article 270AAA that gave blanket protection, immunity and indemnity to the post-Nov 2, 2007, actions and orders.

 

But wasn't PPP inflicting a mortal injury to itself because the same new Article 270AAA also provided constitutional protection to the NRO, 2007? Were these the actions of an immature political party? Or did it simply again emphasise the fact that an understanding of the politics of the PPP as a political party could not be simply reduced to the NRO, 2007.

 

The Constitutional Amendment Bill does, of course, have its own proposed new Article 270AAA which doesn't give protection to the PCO and the Proclamation of Emergency, 2007 but tries to give protection to the NRO, 2007. But that is only, if and when, this bill is passed by the parliament.

 

Therefore, the Eighteenth Amendment Bill does imply a continuity with the romantic love affair of the Murree-Bhurban Declaration because it refuses to recognise the legality of the post-Nov 2, 2007 actions and orders of Musharraf. It affirms that the decision to take on a political conflict with Musharraf is intact and implies a declaration of war without initiating an imminent political conflict.

 

This is the first time in Pakistan's constitutional history that a civilian government has refused to recognise the constitutional amendments made by a dictator.

 

In relation to the issue of the judiciary and the restoration of the non-functional judges, the PPP's bill contains a plethora of constitutional amendments. The constitutional amendments propose to restore the non-functional judges to the Nov 2, 2007 position and seniority in the proposed new Article 270CC.

 

But this restoration of the judges is now conditional on the following elements. First, it implicitly recognises the legality of the current PCO judges and as a consequence, proposes to control the non-functional judges through the greater numbers of the status quo-oriented judges under the PCO.

 

Second, it proposes an intrusive executive presence in the hiring of the superior judiciary [proposed new Articles 177A and 193A] and monopolistic executive control of the firing of the superior judiciary [proposed new Article 209].

 

Third, it creates a limited, ineffective and mere mouth piece, fundamental rights jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [proposed amendment in Article 184(3)].

 

Fourth, the present and future chief justices of the superior courts are proposed to be controlled through restricted tenures [proposed Articles 179 and 195].

 

Therefore, the Eighteenth Amendment Bill does imply a continuity with the romantic love affair of the Murree-Bhurban Declaration because it proposes to restore the non-functional judges to the Nov 2, 2007, position and seniority but this romantic love affair now is conditional and a one-sided love affair.

 

One doesn't need to study constitutional law or judicial history to understand the implications of the aforementioned amendments. The PPP wants to constitutionally create an oxymoron superior judiciary i.e. a subordinate superior judiciary or a judiciary independent of everyone else except the executive. Zardari and PPP's claim that they don't want power but rather want to change systems of power is proved correct by this Eighteenth Amendment Bill because the aforementioned amendment does want to change the structure of an independent judiciary, as envisaged under the original 1973 constitution, to a dependent judiciary.

 

Why has the romantic love affair of the Murree-Bhurban Declaration converted into such a conditional love affair or a proposed one-sided pre-nuptial agreement? Is the PPP simply acting 'evil' when it comes to the judiciary?

 

Maybe, a rational political explanation of the PPP to the Eighteenth Amendment is as follows. The bill is primarily based on the PPP's reading of Pakistani judicial history. In the PPP's mutilated and selective judicial memory, the judiciary, at best, is a useless bourgeois and right wing institution, and, at worst, the judiciary is an institution through which politicians are subdued and harassed and the political and democratic process is disrupted and destroyed. In this collective unconscious of the PPP, judicial dissent on March 9, 2007, and on Nov 3, 2007, are seen merely as tactical actions and this judicial dissent does not imply a strategic change in this allegedly anti-democratic institution.

 

Therefore, no independent judiciary can be destroyed by the Eighteenth Amendment Bill because their allegedly never was, nor is, an independent judiciary. Secondly, after the Murree-Bhurban Declaration, a new relationship has intervened in the life of the PPP i.e. the reality of power politics between institutions and the problem of governance. The PPP as a ruling political party recognises the potential constitutional structural conflict between a consolidating executive and legislature and an emerging independent judiciary (remember the conflicts between Benazir Bhutto and Sajjad Ali Shah and between Nawaz Sharif and Sajjad Ali Shah).

 

Therefore, why not just destroy this independent power institution i.e. judiciary, and consequently, avoid any structural conflicts. Additionally, the restoration of the deposed judges will also give rise to the imminent constitutional structural conflict with Musharraf and, maybe, also with the PCO judges, the political fallout of which may allegedly include the dismantling of the entire democratic system. Supposedly, restoration of the judges through a constitutional amendment will prevent both a conflict with Musharraf and the PCO judges because a constitutional amendment can neither be challenged by Musharraf nor by the Supreme Court.

 

How should one judge the above mentioned political explanation? Should it be dismissed as a bad horror novel or should it be seen as a serious political explanation?

 

Regardless of the moral and constitutional worth of the PPP's proposed bill, I offer only the following political observations. First, after March 9, 2007, and November 3, 2007, the genie and 'disease' of the idea of an independent judiciary which has inflicted and infested the historicity and mindset of the judges, lawyers and the common man, cannot be reversed. The 'disease' of independence is here to stay. Therefore, the proposed bill is an attempt to reverse history. Historical events and realities need to be accepted (even if undesirable) and not fought against.

 

Second no constitutional modern state has been able to avoid structural constitutional conflicts with the judiciary because they arise out of inbuilt structural constitutional contradictions. The judicial history of modern states tell us that constitutional conflicts with the judiciary can only be managed until these conflicts are resolved historically by developing consistent constitutional relationships between the various organs of the state. The PPP's proposed bill cannot bypass history.

 

Third, the PPP does not have a two thirds majority needed to pass these amendments. Opposition members of parliament are unlikely to support amendments which will help the executive control the judiciary because they recognise the importance of independent judicial power against a repressive Pakistani state.

 

Fourth, a constitutional state with fundamental rights, without an independent judiciary to enforce those fundamental rights, is like having a democracy without political parties. Why not just get rid of the pretence that we are a constitutional state with fundamental rights.

 

Fifth, will the PPP want such an executive-dominated dependent judiciary when it is in opposition and appealing for either bail in a criminal case or contesting a false criminal charge?

 

Sixth, isn't an imminent structural conflict with Pervez Musharraf unavoidable because he is like an irritant illegal trespasser always looking to dislodge the rightful repository of public power. Why not fight this imminent political conflict with a recently tested anti-Musharraf judiciary on your side?.

 

Seventh, if there is an inevitable and unavoidable choice between a political conflict with Nawaz Sharif because of the non-restoration of the deposed judges and between a political conflict with Pervez Musharraf or the PCO judges, shouldn't the PPP avoid the former, rather the latter, conflict. Surely, the guarantee to any kind of political stability in Pakistan is in the continuation of this contradictory and incompatible coalition between the PPP and PML (N).

 

Regardless of the above intellectual diatribe, Farooq Naek, the intellectual brain behind these amendments, our legal czar and an experienced parliamentarian, must know that the biggest Constitutional Amendment Act passed in the history of our Pakistani parliament was the Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, 1985, which contained only 19 amendments. The biggest Amendment Act passed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, which contained only 18 amendments (By the way, Bhutto had a two thirds majority in parliament).

 

The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Bill, 2008, contains 79 amendments. Is Mr Naek trying to create history? May be, world constitutional history?. Surely, if he realistically wanted to pass these amendments, a more intelligent strategy would have been to have many constitutional bills with fewer amendments to be passed in a piecemeal manner. For example, like the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1997, passed by the Nawaz Sharif government, contained only four amendments, which reversed and corrected the political and power imbalances between the prime minister and president. But without having access to, or insight into, the political decision making of the PPP, one can only engage in some kind of analytical speculation.

 

The Constitution (Eighteen Amendment) Bill, 2008, really looks like a beautiful shell. Beautiful from the outside but empty inside. At worst, it is a fantasy and, at best, a maximalist position on which the PPP is willing to compromise e.g. it may be willing to go back to the tactical solution of the good old romantic days of the Murree-Bhurban declaration (especially now after the passage of the Finance Bill, 2008, which accepts the physical presence of the Supreme Court judges under the PCO) and then later on also try to pass, bits and pieces, of the judicially-oriented amendments of the Constitution (Eighteen Amendment) Bill, 2008.

 

Or may be, it is merely a political strategy to delay a solution to these problems so that the PPP can consolidate its power before taking on these difficult political problems. Sadly, the issue of the restoration of the judges is a major cause of persistent instability in Pakistan and in the fractured and transitional democratic politics of Pakistan, political instability and power consolidation are dangerously incompatible notions.

 

The romantic journey from Murree to the constitutional package has shown us that irrespective of the fights within our democratic constitutional family (i.e. between the PPP and PML(N) and the judiciary), there is at least consensus among all its members about the source of our common political and constitutional woes -- the system of military dictatorship in Pakistan.

 

Courtesy: The News Pakistan